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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
In St Helens MBC v Derbyshire & Others1 the Court of Appeal was asked to consider 
alleged victimisation discrimination by an employer in the course of litigation brought 
by 39 employees seeking to enforce their rights under the Equal Pay Act 1970. The case 
illustrates the difficulties litigation poses to the employment relationship. Once 
proceedings are commenced, the parties are not only employer and employee but also 
adversaries in litigation. The proximity of such an ongoing relationship can, and 
frequently does, create further difficulties. For example, to what extent can the 
employer take steps to preserve its tactical position in the litigation? If the employer 
fails to protect its position as employer sufficiently, it risks undermining its litigation 
position. Conversely i f it adopts an aggressive strategy toward the litigation, it leaves 
itself as employer vulnerable to the possibility of an additional claim for victimisation 
from the employee-litigant. The present case is a model example of such conflicts in 
practice. 
T H E F A C T S 
In 1998, 510 female schools catering staff employed by St Helens M B C ("the Council") 
brought equal pay claims against the Council. The majority of the applicants agreed 
to settle their claims against the Council. However 39 employees, including Mrs 
Derbyshire, did not accept the settlement and proceeded with their claims. Some two 
months prior to the hearing, the Council's acting Director of Environmental 
Protection, M r Sanderson, drafted and sent two letters. 
One letter was sent to all catering staff, including the applicants. It referred to the 
forthcoming tribunal hearing and the costs of a successful equal pay claim. It stated, 
inter alia, that: 
The above costs will make provision of the service wholly unviable. In such circumstances 
the council will be forced to consider ceasing the provision of the service other than to 
those who are entitled to receive it by law i.e. free school meal provision. Only a very small 
proportion of the existing workforce would be required for this . . . Regrettably, although 
many of you have chosen to work with the council to address the issues of equality outside 
of the tribunal by way of single status/job evaluation process, the continuance of the 
current claims and a ruling against the council will have a severe impact on all staff. 
The second letter was individually addressed to each of the remaining 39 applicants. 
It stated: 
I am greatly concerned about the likely outcome of this matter as stated in the letter to 
catering staff. . . . The original offer of settlement remains open to you and I would urge 
you to consider this, together with the information provided in this and my other letter 
1
 [2005] E W C A Civ 977, [2005] I R L R 801. 
28 
Case and Comment 29 
regarding our commitment to achieving equality by other means, aimed at preserving the 
service and jobs . . . I cannot overstate the impact that the current course of action will 
have on the service and everyone employed within it. 
C A S E H I S T O R Y 
The applicants brought claims of victimisation under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
("the Act") against their employers. They claimed that the letters had caused them 
considerable distress and would adversely impact upon their working relationships. A n 
initial employment tribunal dismissed the complaints. The Employment Appeals 
Tribunal ( " E A T " ) then allowed an appeal against that decision and remitted the case 
to a fresh employment tribunal for rehearing in order to consider the issues of less 
favourable treatment, detriment and the reason for any less favourable treatment. The 
second employment tribunal upheld their claims unanimously and the Council appealed 
to the E A T . The E A T upheld the applicants' complaints of victimisation and the 
Council was given leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. 
T H E L E G A L ISSUES 
The main question for the Court of Appeal was whether the sending of the two letters 
by M r Sanderson breached section 4 of the Act .2 Section 4 (1) of the Act is concerned 
with discrimination by way of victimisation within the arena of sex discrimination. It 
states that: 
A person ("the discriminator") discriminates against another person ("the person 
victimised") in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Act if 
he treats the person victimised less favourably than in those circumstances he treats or 
would treat other persons, and does so by reason that the person victimised has -
(a) brought proceedings against the discriminator or any other person under this Act or 
the Equal Pay Act 1970 . . . 
or by reason that the discriminator knows that the person victimised intends to do any of 
those things, or suspects the person victimised has done, or intends to do, any of them. 
Upon reading the above, it is apparent that the section involves asking two distinct, 
albeit related, questions. First, did the applicants receive less favourable treatment? 
Secondly, i f so, was it by reason of their having brought proceedings under the Equal 
Pay Act 1970? For the purposes of clarity, this case will be analysed by reference to 
the above questions. However, it should be remembered that the two issues significantly 
interact with one another and, often "the less favourable treatment issue cannot be 
resolved without, at the same time, decidmg the reason why issue";3 a point recognised 
by Mummery L J in the present case.4 
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LESS FAVOURABLE TREATMENT 
In Mummery LJ's opinion, the employment tribunal was entitled to conclude that the 
sending of the letters by the Council amounted to less favourable treatment of the 39 
applicants. In this instance, the appropriate comparators were the Council employees 
who had either not brought claims or had discontinued them. Due to the imminent 
tribunal hearing, the applicants were particularly susceptible to pressure from the 
Council either to settle or to withdraw their claims. This pressure was only increased 
by the sending of letters to them and to their colleagues which detailed the possible 
consequences of successful claims. Indeed, "the more usual and acceptable means of 
communication would have been with the applicants' union or their solicitors".5 
Consequently, the receipt of the letters by the applicants was capable of provoking a 
reaction of fear, threat and intimidation, which the employment tribunal was entitled 
to conclude amounted to a detriment to, and less favourable treatment of, the 
applicants. Jonathan Parker LJ agreed with Mummery LJ , whilst Lloyd L J did not 
comment specifically upon this issue. 
" B Y REASON T H A T . . ." 
It was upon the issue of causation that their Lordships significantly differed in their 
judgments. 
The Council contended that the reason for sending both letters was not because of 
the applicants' proceedings under the Act, but rather its concerns over financial 
difficulties, the possible future of the school meals service and the protection of its 
litigation position in the proceedings. Mummery L J disagreed. In his opinion, the 
Council went further than necessary to protect its litigation position. This was not an 
honest and reasonable attempt by the Council to compromise the proceedings, rather 
an attempt to intimidate the applicants. As the applicants were legally represented, the 
correct course of action would have been for the Council to enter into communication 
regarding settlement either with the applicants' legal representatives or their union.6 
Consequently, the employment tribunal was entitled to examine not only the contents 
of the two letters but also all relevant surrounding circumstances. In doing so, it was 
entitled to conclude that the reason for the sending of the two letters was the fact that 
the applicants had brought, and were continuing, claims against the Council. 
Jonathan Parker L J referred to the House of Lords' decision in Khan,1 a claim of 
victimisation under the Race Relations Act 1976, which concerned the refusal to 
provide a reference whilst a race discrimination claim was pending. Significantly, he 
relied on Lord NicholPs comment that: 
. . . Employers, acting honestly and reasonably, ought to be able to take steps to preserve 
their position in pending discrimination proceedings without laying themselves open to a 
charge of victimisation . . . An employer who conducts himself in this way is not doing so 
because of the fact that the complainant has brought discrimination proceedings. He is 
doing so because, currently and temporarily, he needs to take steps to preserve his position 
in the outstanding proceedings.8 
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In both the opinion of Parker and Lloyd LJJ, the employment tribunal had 
misdirected itself and failed to consider whether the sending of the letters by the 
Council could be construed as an honest and reasonable attempt to compromise the 
proceedings. They therefore allowed the Council's appeal and remitted the case to 
the employment tribunal for its consideration on this specific point. 
CONCLUSION 
All three of their Lordships agreed that the employment tribunal had been entitled to 
conclude that the 39 applicants had been treated less favourably by the Council. 
However, whilst Mummery LJ considered that the tribunal was entitled to conclude 
that the reason for such less favourable treatment was the commencement and 
continuance of proceedings under the Act, Lloyd and Jonathan Parker LJJ disagreed. 
Applying the House of Lords' decision in Khan they reasoned that the tribunal had 
failed to consider whether the Council's actions amounted to an honest and reasonable 
attempt to compromise the proceedings. 
There is nothing unreasonable in attempting to persuade an employee to agree to a 
compromise. However, in doing so, employers must behave honestly and reasonably if 
they wish to acquire the protection afforded by Khan. In this instance one must take 
into account the fact that the applicants had retained the services of legal advisers. In 
such cases one would expect all negotiations regarding a potential compromise of the 
proceedings to be directed to the applicants' solicitors. The Council's decision to 
contact the applicants directly may, at best, be viewed as poor judgment and, at worst, 
as a dishonest and unreasonable attempt to exert pressure upon the applicants which 
does not merit the exception provided for by Khan. 
Coupled with this is the point that two letters were sent; one to only the 39 
applicants and the second to all catering staff including the applicants. Whilst all judges 
involved in the decision examined the receipt of the letters by the applicants as one 
single event, it is submitted that they are best considered individually. When viewed in 
such a manner, subject to the concerns raised in the preceeding paragraph, it is 
arguable that the letter to the 39 applicants only could potentially be viewed as an 
honest and reasonable attempt to compromise the proceedings. Of greater concern, 
however is the second letter which was sent to all members of the Council's catering 
staff. There was, in fact, no need for the Council to communicate with these individuals 
for settlement purposes. When viewed objectively, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
Council's primary intention in sending these letters was to direct the other catering staff 
to believe that the applicants' actions were jeopardising not only the security of their 
jobs but the future of the catering service as a whole. Indeed, it is difficult to 
comprehend how correspondence from the Council to individuals not party to the 
ongoing proceedings could be viewed as action necessary for the purposes of preserving 
their litigation position. Consequently, in the absence of ah adequate explanation from 
the Council, an employment tribunal would be entitled to conclude that they had 
committed an unlawful act of discrimination against the applicants. Further, as such 
correspondence was not for the purposes of a potential settlement, the protection 
afforded by Khan is inapplicable. 
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